In this paper we introduce our model-driven software engineering method, called SecureMDD, which 
Introduction
In our opinion, only by considering security aspects from the beginning of the development of an application the resulting system can be really secure. Thus, our approach makes use of model-driven development techniques and combines the formal verification of an abstract model as well as the generation of executable code. We use UML to model the system under development and define a UML profile to be able to express security-relevant aspects. To generate complete, executable code as well as a formal model of the whole application we have to be able to model the complete application including the processing of messages. For this reason we extend UML by a simple abstract language which allows the expression of state changes. We generate only the security-critical part of an application but omit e.g. user interfaces or database access.
We focus on security-critical distributed systems since the correctness of these applications is essential. Those systems have in common that they are based on cryptographic protocols which are inherently difficult to design. Applications of this domain are for example E-Commerce applications such as electronic ticket systems or electronic payment systems. We currently focus on smart card applications since they are inherently security-critical but limited in their size. In the future, we plan to extend the approach to further security-critical application scenarios, for example applications using web services such as the German electronic health card.
A lot of research has been done covering the abstract specification of applications based on security protocols and developing verification approaches which aim to prove that these specifications are secure. Most of these approaches do not consider the implementation of applications. But the security properties proved on the abstract level do not necessary hold on an implementation level, since additional weaknesses and programming errors may be added on the code level. In our approach we cover both, the abstract specification of a system as well as executable code, and aim to generate code which is a correct refinement of the abstract model used for verification. In previous work [6] we already proved successfully that hand-written code is a refinement of an abstract specification for several security-critical applications.
Section 2 gives an overview of our model-driven SecureMDD approach. Section 3 describes the modeling of a security-critical application with UML. Section 4 gives a short overview of the formal model which we use to verify security properties. In Section 5 some challenges regarding the automatic generation of Java Card code are described. Section 6 introduces our ideas of how to prove formally that the generated Java(Card) code is a correct refinement of the generated formal model. Section 7 touches related work and Section 8 concludes.
The SecureMDD Approach in a Nutshell
In this Section we give an overview of our model-driven approach, see Fig. 1 . We start to model a (smart card) application with UML. The modeling is done platformindependently and on an abstract level, e.g. it is independent of the Java Card code as well as the formal model ( 1 '! &" %# $ ). We use a UML profile which is tailored to model security-relevant aspects and extend UML activity diagrams by a simple modeling language called MEL (Model Extension Language) to express the processing of a message, e.g. state changes and cryptographic operations like encryption.
In the UML meta model these expressions are stored as strings. In a next step ( 2 '! &" %# $ ), these strings have to be parsed and stored in an abstract syntax tree. To achieve this, we extend the UML meta model by a model of the abstract syntax tree of the MEL language. The resulting model is the same as the one in 1 '! &" %# $ with the difference that the MEL expressions are models instead of strings. On this level, we still have a platform-independent view of the system. Then, we use the extended UML model to generate e.g. two platform-specific models, one for the Java(Card) code and the other one for the formal model ( 3 '! &" %# $ ). These models contain platform-specific information as for example, Java Card data types, overflow checks, and the MEL expressions are translated into syntactically correct Java Card code resp. abstract state machine (ASM) code. In a next step, these platform-specific models are translated into a Java model resp. a formal ASM model ( 4 '! &" %# $ ). Reasons for this step will be explained in Sect. 6. These models are abstract syntax trees of Java resp. ASMs. Afterwards, in a model-to-text (M2T) transformation, both models are transformed into Java Card code resp. a formal model ( 5 '! &" %# $ ). The latter can be used to prove security properties of the modeled application using our interactive theorem prover KIV. For hand-written formal models we already developed a method to prove security properties [8] . We implement the model-to-model applications with the language QVT and all model-to-text transformations with XPand.
Modeling with UML: Example Copy Card
In this section we give an overview of our modeling method. The models introduced here give the platform-independent view of a smart card application. To illustrate our approach we use an application which is used to replace coins by electronic cash. That is, the smart card stores money and the owner of a card can pay with it, for example at a copying machine.
Use cases are written to capture the functional as well as security requirements of the system under development. To model the static view of an application we use class diagrams. The dynamic aspects of the system under development are described by sequence as well as activity diagrams. Deployment diagrams are used to define the structure of the system. Additionally, they describe the capabilities an attacker has to affect and to interfere the communication between authentic components or to use fake components, e.g. to attempt to pay with a forged copycard. This information is later needed for verification.
In Fig. 2 the platform-independent class diagram of the copycard application is shown. To express cryptographic data types like keys, nonces and so on we use predefined classes. Additionally, we add a data type for secrets. A secret is a string that cannot be guessed by an attacker, for example a PIN number. This information is needed to verify security properties using the formal model.
The copycard application consists of a terminal (which has a card reader and is used to load money onto a card as well as to pay) and the copycard. Both components are defined as classes in the diagram and annotated with stereotype ≪Terminal≫ and ≪Smartcard≫. The attributes of the components are either primitive types or associations to other classes. In the example, the card has only three primitive attributes: the balance stores the current amount of money that is stored on the card, the passphrase describes a secret which identifies the copycard as a nonfake card and is used for authentication as well as the challenge attribute of type Nonce that is used to avoid replay attacks. Data is either non-cryptographic data, plain data (e.g. data that is intended to be encrypted), hash data (data that will be hashed) or sign data (data that will be signed). For all these kinds we define stereotypes. In the diagram the class AuthData is a data type which holds data that will be hashed during a protocol run and is annotated with stereotype ≪HashData≫. All message types ex- Fig. 3 ). It contains the amount of money that is going to be loaded as well as a hashed object. This object ensures that the terminal used to upload money is authentic. The information that this object is hashed is given by the stereotype ≪hashed≫ which is added to the association end.
The dynamic view of the system under development is described by sequence and activity diagrams. Sequence diagrams are used to develop the cryptographic protocol and model the messages that are exchanged. The activity diagrams extend the sequence diagrams and define the messages sent between components as well as the processing of a message after reception including state changes of the component. For each protocol one activity diagram is defined. Here, we only present the activity diagram which describes the process of loading money onto a card, see Fig. 3 . Note that we do not use state machines because we emphasize the protocol flow between the components which can be visualized when using activity diagrams.
To load money onto a card the used terminal has to be authentic. To guarantee this, each authentic terminal stores a passphrase which is the same for all terminals and is never sent as plaintext, i.e. unknown to an attacker. Before loading money the terminal has to authenticate against the card. This is done by sending a hash value which contains the passphrase. To avoid replay attacks the hash value also contains a nonce which is requested by the terminal, i.e. for each load process the copycard generates a nonce and sends it to the terminal. Furthermore, the amount to be loaded is contained in the hash value. This ensures that an attacker is not able to manipulate the value while sending it to the card.
We use AcceptEventActions to model the receiving of a message and SendSignalActions to denote the sending of a message to another component. All attributes , the smart card sets its state to EXPLOAD and generates a new nonce which is stored in the attribute challenge. This ensures that a load message is only processed if a new challenge was generated. Afterwards the copycard sends a ResAuthenticate message back to the terminal which contains the generated nonce ( 3 '! &" %# $ ). The terminal receives this message and generates a hash value of the constant LOAD, the passphrase (both are defined in the class diagram), the challenge recently received and the value to be loaded. The resulting hash value is stored in the local variable hashedauth ( 4 '! &" %# $ ) of type HashedData. HashedData is a predefined data type. Then, the terminal sends a Load message to the card which contains the value to be loaded as well as the hash value. The copycard receives this message ( 5 '! &" %# $ ) and checks whether its state is set to EXPLOAD. If so, the state is set to IDLE and it is checked whether the received hash value is correct. Then, it is tested if the amount to load is greater than zero and the amount added to the current balance of the card does not exceed an upper limit. If all checks succeed, the balance of the card is increased, otherwise the protocol execution aborts (which is modeled by a FlowFinalNode ⊗).
The Formal Model
To prove the security of the system under development we automatically generate a formal model which is suitable for our interactive theorem prover KIV. The static aspects of the modeled application are defined by algebraic specifications whereas the dynamic part of the system is translated into an abstract state machine (ASM) [2] . The formal model uses the application-dependent data types (in contrast to, e.g. [12] ) which are defined in the class diagram, i.e. specifications exist for the messages, hash data and so on. A formal model that is close to the UML models is very helpful for interactive verification.
To model the attacker we define the attacker knowledge which contains all (relevant) data known by the attacker during a protocol run. The attacker knowledge may contain all data that is part of a message and can be analyzed by the attacker. In the copycard example this includes nonces as well as hash values because they are part of the ResAuthenticate and Load messages. All nonsecurity-critical data such as the amount to load is not explicitly stored in the attacker knowledge because this data is irrelevant for the attacker. As the dynamic part of the system is modeled as an abstract state machine, we define an ASM rule that nondeterministically chooses a component that executes a protocol step. For example, if the copycard is chosen and the message sent to the copycard is of type Load, the ASM rule describing the processing of a Load message (shown in List. 1) is executed. To generate the ASM code, the activity diagrams are used as input. 
Listing 1. ASM rule for a Load message
The rule corresponds closely to the activity diagram, but differs in the syntax and semantics of the expressions. For example, in lines 6-8 the hash value is checked (cf. 6 '! &" %# $ in Fig. 3 ). Here, a predefined operation verifyhash is used, and mkAuthData is an algebraic constructor. Furthermore, in the formal model an arbitrary number of copycards exist, and the fields of the chosen one ag are accessed by dynamic functions (passphrase(ag) and challenge(ag)). One relevant security property for the copycard application is that no money can be created, i.e. the sum of money that is received by all terminals when loading money onto a card is always greater or equal than the sum of amounts which are spent when paying with the card. This property is formulated as a theorem and proven for the formal model. All security properties are defined on the formal model by the developer.
Code Generation
Java Card is a version of Java tailored to smart cards with very limited resources. Java Card has the same language constructs as Java, but omits resource intensive data types and language features. Java Card has no integers, strings, or floats. Garbage collection and threads are not supported. Furthermore, the API is completely different from the standard Java edition. This means that Java Card programs usually operate only on byte arrays and use short arithmetic.
Typically, all objects and arrays are allocated once when the Java Card program is loaded onto the smart card and reused if necessary.
For the UML classes of the class diagram Java classes are generated, and the activity diagrams are transformed into methods and their body. The main method of the generated Copycard class simply determines what type of message was sent and calls a method that handles the message.
Communication with the smart card is done by sending sequences of bytes with a maximum length of 256 bytes. In our SecureMMD approach the generated Java Card code is not based on byte arrays, but object oriented and uses the same classes as the UML model. This has two major advantages: (1) the code is very readable, and close to the model, and (2) it allows to reason about the correctness of the code using refinement theory (this will be explained in Sect. 6). However, this requires an encoding of messages into bytes which is also generated automatically. The encoding shows the advantages of code generation: Reflection is not supported in Java Card, so a generic implementation is not possible. But the implementation is not trivial and rather long, and a coding by hand will certainly contain errors at first.
[5] presents a formal verification for the encoding of generic messages.
As mentioned above, Java Card does not support garbage collection. This means that encoding and decoding messages on the smart card must reuse existing byte arrays and objects. This is possible since the valid messages are determined by the UML model. The idea is to allocate the necessary objects for each message (four in this application) once and to decode into these objects. A message that does not 'fit' is not authentic and will be answered by an error message anyway. Reusing objects has other effects. For example, in some cases the contents of an object must be copied. This requires a careful sharing analysis.
The generated code of the copycard application has about 1000 lines.
Correctness of the Transformations
When code is generated from a UML model it is natural to ask about its correctness. For several reasons this question is very difficult to answer in a formal manner: (1) A formal UML semantics is required. This semantics is probably not for UML in general, but needs some domain specific features because the generated code is specific. In our example the generated code is tailored to the Java Card API. This is only implicitly present in the UML model. It is reasonable to ask what the benefit of such a specific semantics is. (2) Code generation produces text, the source code. Even with intermediate models the last step is a model-to-text transformation that concatenates strings. Reasoning about the correctness of the code requires a proof that the concatenated strings are valid source code. This means: the code can be parsed and compiled (i.e. passes all compiler checks), and behaves as expected. Parsing, creating an annotated syntax tree, and performing all compile time checks is extremely difficult for Java. All proof systems for Java start with an annotated abstract syntax tree. There exists no formalization for parsing and annotating for full Java. And even if there were, it is still an open question how to reason about the creation of the text. (3) A formal semantics for the target programming language is needed. (4) A formal semantics and a proof system for the transformation language is needed.
In our SecureMDD approach we propose the following four solutions to these four problems: (1) We generate a formal model and code. The idea is to reason about the correctness of the code with respect to the formal model, not w.r.t. the UML model. (2) Instead of producing text from a UML model, we introduce a Java model. This model represents an annotated abstract syntax tree. We use a modelto-model transformation to create this model, and a modelto-text transformation to create the source code from the model. The Java model is suitable for a formal treatment (i.e. it can be used in our proof system), and the model-totext transformation is a generic pretty printing that is not application specific. While still outside the scope of a formal treatment, we believe that it is much easier to convince oneself that the pretty printing is correct once and for all, than to argue for every M2T transformation that it produces correct code. (3) There exists a formal Java semantics in our KIV system. (4) We plan to define a formal semantics and implement a proof system for QVT. The idea towards correctness is summarized in Fig. 4 (cf. Fig. 1 ). Starting with a UML model U, two transformations transJ and transA are applied that yield a Java model and an ASM model, respectively. The Java program (given by the model) is correct if it is a (correct) refinement of the ASM model, i.e. transJ(U) transA(U). The refinement theory is well established [7] and tailored to security-critical Java Card applications.
The method was applied successfully [6] to the Mondex electronic purse [9] . Here, both the formal ASM and the Java Card program were written manually, and the correctness of the refinement proved formally for the application. However, the proof is far from trivial. If it is possible to prove that the two transformations transJ and transA always preserve refinement correctness it is no longer necessary to prove the correctness of every application individually. Without a general transformation correctness result, the SecureMDD approach still allows these individual correctness proofs. Furthermore, in [6] a very general type of messages was used which allows reuse in other applications, but which complicates proofs. With the SecureMDD approach that uses application specific data types, these complications can be avoided. Of course, the question about the (formal) relationship between the UML model and the formal ASM model is not answered by the approach, but the notion of correctness (of the generated code) is formally defined.
Related Work
The two most closely related approaches are UMLSec by Jan Jürjens [10] and SecureUML by David Basin et. al. [1] . Both use UML to model security-critical applications. The main difference is that they do not generate runnable code since they focus on modeling the security related parts. They do not model specifics of the application like increasing the balance of the copycard and express only standard security properties. These, however, can be proved automatically with a model checker. Both approaches have a mathematical paper semantics for UML. In the context of SecureUML a model transformation into OCL is defined as the semantics of SecureUML [3] , and there exists proof support for OCL in Isabelle. Mayer et al. [11] translate activity diagrams into WS-BPEL and Java (among others) in a SOA setting. They extend UML with a few new model elements, but do not have their own language (like our MEL) to model actions. Hence the generated Java code is not yet runnable. Eshuis [4] deals with model-checking of UML activity diagrams in general but does not use activity diagrams in a specific manner.
Conclusion
The paper presents SecureMDD, a novel approach to the design of security-critical distributed applications. The application is modeled with UML. From this model, a formal abstract state machine (ASM) specification and Java Card code are generated. The security of the application is proved on the level of the ASM specification. We present an idea how the correctness and security of the generated code can be formally proved. The complete approach goes beyond other existing results.
